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Abstract—Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) are ex-
pected to constantly interact with a network of processing nodes
installed in secure cabinets located at the side of the road –
thus, forming Fog Computing-based infrastructure for Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITSs). Future city-scale ITS services
will heavily rely upon the sensor data regularly off-loaded by
each CAV on the Fog Computing network. Due to the broadcast
nature of the medium, CAVs’ communications can be vulnerable
to eavesdropping. This paper proposes a novel data offloading
approach where the Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC)
principle is used to ensure the probability of an eavesdropper
to recover relevant portions of sensor data is minimized. Our
preliminary results confirm the effectiveness of our approach
when operated in a large-scale ITS networks.
Index Terms—Intercept Probability, Secrecy Outage Probabil-
ity, Data Offloading, Fog Computing, ITS, CAV, V2X.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
According to the 5G-PPP and the European C-ITS initiative,
cooperation will be a crucial feature of the future Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITSs), to deliver safety- and mission-
critical services among connected vehicles [1]. Future city-
scale ITS services will rely upon Connected and Autonomous
Vehicles (CAVs) offloading their sensor data onto the Fog
Computing layer via a network of Road Side Units (RSUs).
The Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) approach can
be used [2]: (i) to improve the reliability of the data offloading
process, and (ii) to streamline the removal of duplicated sensor
data received by neighboring RSUs.
CAVs communications are inherently vulnerable to eaves-
dropping. Traditional physical layer security strategies ensure
secrecy by making it impossible for the eavesdropper to
recover any of the transmitted packets. A CAV, offloading its
sensor data employing the RNLC principle, does no longer
require a per-packet secrecy. The system can be simplified
as [3]: (i) each transmitted packet is obtained by a linear
combination of a number of source packets, and (ii) the source
packets can only be recovered after the target number of
linearly independent packets has been received.
This paper defines a novel and agile RLNC-based com-
munication strategy. Our approach minimizes the intercept
probability of a sensitive data offloading process – defined as
the probability of an eavesdropper recovering relevant portions
of the data. With these regards, we will answer the following
research questions: [Q1] What is the impact of RNLC-related
parameters on the intercept probability and ultimately [Q2]
What is the minimum intercept probability that can be achieved
in a large-scale urban testbed?
Fig. 1. Considered system model – A CAV offloads its sensors data onto a
Fog Computing Infrastructure according to the proposed RLNC principle.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
We consider the system model shown in Fig. 1. R RSUs
{RSUi}
R
i=1 are positioned on one side of a straight road
section, with width w m [4]. All RSUs are considered to
be ITS-G5 Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
RSUs. We assume that Inter-site Distance (ISD) is the service
area of an RSU. Within ISD, an RSU can receive the sensor
data offloaded by each CAV with a Packet Error Probability
(PEP) smaller than or equal to ǫR. ISD length i is fixed, i.e.,
each RSU provides coverage across an (i× w) m2 area.
We assume that each sensor data stream can be represented
as a sequence of packets with the same byte length. Then, we
propose to organize the sensor data stream into a sequence
of S1, S2, . . . , Sd source messages, where St (for 1 ≤ t ≤
d) consists of K ≥ 2 consecutive sensor data packets. For
each source message St, according to the RLNC principle, a
coded packet is obtained as a random linear combination of
the sensor data packets forming the same source message – the
random linear combinations are performed over a finite field
Fq with size q. A source message can be recovered as soon
as K linearly independent coded packets (associated with the
message) are successfully received [2]. RSUs are connected
to the same Fog Computing infrastructure that is in charge of:
(i) collecting each coded packet, successfully received by each
RSU, and (ii) decoding each source message.
A. Secure Data Offloading for Future CAVs
In our system model, a single eavesdropper is present.
In particular, the eavesdropper is stationary and located on
the same side of the road where the RSUs are installed.
Our strategy aims at minimizing the intercept probability by
spreading the transmissions of coded packets associated with
the same source message across R ≥ 2 RSUs, related to
two or more neighboring coverage areas. In order to achieve
this, we say that each CAV broadcasts one coded packet per
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Fig. 2. Recovery and intercept probability as a function of N − K , for
q = {2, 28}, K = {10, 15, 20}, d = 1 and C = 2.
source message, starting from S1 and progressively moving to
Sd. Then the transmission of coded packets restarts from S1.
Each CAV broadcasts N coded packets per source message
as it drives across C coverage areas – in the remainder of
the paper, C will be regarded as the reset area. In an ITS-G5
DSRC communication systems, Local Dynamic Map (LDM)
messages list the locations of all active RSUs in a certain area.
This list can be broadcast to CAVs by any RSU [4]. Thus, we
assume that each CAV is aware of the location, and to that
extent of the coverage area, associated with each RSU.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We considered a scenario where four RSUs provide cov-
erage over a straight stretch of road. In addition, a CAV
progressively drives across all the coverage areas offloading
its sensor data. As for the channel conditions, we referred to
the coverage data collected during the large-scale car trials
carried out in the center of Bristol, UK, using our installed
experimental ITS-G5 DSRC testbed [5].
We set the length i of the ISD to 1200m and we place
the eavesdropper exactly in between the first and the second
RSU (from the left), as per Fig. 1. In order to investigate the
system performance in the worst-case scenario, we assumed
that the channel conditions experienced by the eavesdropper
are comparable with those experienced by each RSU.
Fig. 2 refers to the case where a single source message
is considered (d = 1) and the reset area C is equal to 2.
In particular, this figure shows both the probability of Fog
Computing infrastructure recovering a source message D and
the intercept probability I as a function of N −K . Regardless
of the value of K , both D and I increase as the number of
the overall coded packet transmissions increases as well, i.e.,
N −K . In addition, due to the increased code efficiency, both
D and I are sensibly greater as q changes from 2 to 28 [2].
Let Fig. 2 serve as a benchmark of the overall system
performance. In Fig. 3, we increased C to 4. For d = 1, we
D(N)
I(N)
(a) q = 2
D(N)
I(N)
(b) q = 28
Fig. 3. Recovery and intercept probability as a function of N − K , for
q = {2, 28}, K = {20, 30, 40}, d = {1, 5} and C = 4.
observe that the value of D remains essentially unaltered – still
ensuring the Fog Computing infrastructure to recover a source
message with a probability greater then 0.85 for N −K > 5.
On the other hand the value of I is significantly reduced, if
compared to the corresponding cases in Fig. 2. For instance,
for q = 2, K = 10 and N −K = 10, the value of I decreases
from 0.64 to about 0 as C changes from 2 to 4.
From Fig. 3, we also observe that the more K and d
increase1, the more I decreases, if compared to corresponding
cases in Fig. 2. This shows how spreading the transmission of
each source message across the whole reset area C drastically
reduces the intercept probability.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an agile strategy for securing the of-
floading of sensor data in a CAV context. As for [Q1] and
[Q2], our numerical results show that the proposed RLNC-
based broadcasting strategy ensures the significant reduction
of the intercept probability, while the probability of the sensor
data being successfully offloaded remains unaltered.
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1For d > 1, with a slight abuse of notation, D and I signify the probability
of the Fog Computing infrastructure recovering a source message and the
intercept probability averaged over the source messages S1, . . . , Sd.
